

S-E-C-R-E-T

TEXT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

11 October 1962

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 39-62

(Internal ONE Working Paper -
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SUBJECT: Use of Cuba As a Soviet ~~Strategic Missile~~ Base

Installation of Soviet MRBMs & IRBMs in Cuba.

NOTE TO THE BOARD

Prepared at the request of AD/NE.

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(
hand writing)

1. It remains our judgement that the USSR does not intend to install long range surface to surface strategic missiles* in Cuba, at least for the present. The provision of IL-28s** confirms that the Soviets wish, at a minimum, to strengthen further Cuba's defenses and, [at a probably also maximum] to test anew US reactions to further buildups by supplying a weapon which has ^{an offensive?} a capability

** The IL-28 or BEAGLE, first produced in 1950, is a jet light bomber with a combat radius of 700 n.m. and a cruising speed of 435 m.p.h.

*

700 n.m. range and greater

against portions of US territory.
 In considering the military and
 political advantages and disad-
 vantages of deploying MRBMs or
 IRBMs in Cuba, the USSR would
 be concerned first of all with
 the risk of US ^{forceful} reaction [in force]
 against Castro. While we believe
 that ^{Soviets} they presently estimate
 this risk as very high, their
 future estimates will be heavily
 influenced by US reactions to
 the current buildup and ^{to future} ~~any~~
 incremental ^{changes in} ~~addition to~~ the scale & nature of their
^{military aid program to Cuba} future expansion which they may
 undertake.

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